Dividing the Pleistocene pie: review of Nicolas Baumard, the origins of fairness: how evolution explains our moral nature (Paul Reeve, Trans.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 272pp., $74 (hardback), ISBN: 978-0190210229. by Birch, Jonathan & Witteveen, Joeri
Dividing the Pleistocene pie 
 
Review of Nicolas Baumard, The Origins of Fairness: How Evolution Explains Our 
Moral Nature (Paul Reeve, Trans.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 272pp., 
$74 (hardback), ISBN: 978-0190210229. 
 
Jonathan Birch and Joeri Witteveen 
 
The sense of fairness is a central aspect of human moral psychology. Intuitions about fairness 
lead to many widespread moral beliefs, such as the belief that the punishment should fit the 
crime, or the belief that one deserves a fair share of what one has earned. In The Origins of 
Fairness, Nicolas Baumard sets out to shed light on the evolutionary origin of these 
intuitions. He argues that the human sense of fairness is innate and universal, and he offers an 
account of its evolution that highlights the role of bargaining in early human ‘cooperation 
markets’.  
 
The book is a translation into English of a book published in French as Comment Nous 
Sommes Devenus Moraux [How We Became Moral] in 2010. There is much to like about it: 
it is ambitious, wide-ranging, and accessible. The translator, Paul Reeve, has done an 
excellent job. Such a book deserves to be read, and to be subjected to scrutiny. Here, rather 
than providing a chapter-by-chapter summary, we will discuss the evolutionary account at the 
heart of the argument.  
 
An evolved sense of fairness 
Baumard’s big idea is that early humans, living in small-scale, hunter-gatherer societies in the 
Pleistocene epoch, routinely faced the problem of choosing partners with whom to 
collaborate (e.g. for the purpose of hunting big game). This led to simple 
bargaining situations, in which potential social partners would negotiate over how to divide 
the fruits of their cooperation (let’s call it ‘the pie’), with the ‘outside option’ of walking 
away and choosing someone else if the division was unappealing.  
 
Over the last few years, Baumard and colleagues have made various evolutionary models of 
these bargaining situations, with the aim of studying how the outside options available to 
each agent affect the way the pie is divided. The overall message of their work is that, when 
two agents are equal in their reputation, and thus have equally good outside options, agreeing 
on an equitable division of the pie is mutually advantageous. However, when there is a 
reputational asymmetry, such that one agent has better outside options than the other, this 
agent has greater bargaining power, and can therefore command a larger share of the pie. 
 
The most successful agents in the ‘cooperation market’ would thus have been those who 
demanded a share of the pie that accurately reflected their relative bargaining power. But the 
stakes would have been high. Misjudging one’s relative bargaining power, or that of a 
prospective collaborator, would have been costly. Those who demanded too much, in the 
eyes of their prospective social partners, were shunned, whereas those who demanded too 
little were exploited. 
 
Clearly, success in a cooperation market calls for subtle calculations. One needs an accurate 
sense of one’s own bargaining power, and of the bargaining power of others. Baumard’s 
hypothesis is that, given the adaptive importance of getting these calculations right, we 
should expect a dedicated, innate mental faculty to have evolved for this task—and that 
faculty is the sense of fairness. Roughly, a division of the pie that accurately reflects the 
relative bargaining power of each agent is intuitively judged to be fair, whereas a division 
that gives an agent more, or less, than their relative bargaining power commands is intuitively 
judged to be unfair. 
 
Fairness vs bargaining power 
It is a fascinating hypothesis. On the face of it, however, it seems to posit too close a link 
between bargaining power and intuitive judgements of fairness. If our sense of fairness 
evolved to help us avoid exploitation and exclusion in cooperation markets, we should 
intuitively judge a division of the pie to be fair when all agents receive a share that accurately 
reflects their relative bargaining power. This appears to be the basic qualitative prediction of 
Baumard’s approach. Yet (as DeScioli 2013 has noted) this often seems not to be the case. 
Bargaining power is sensitive to supply and demand, whereas our judgements of 
fairness seem much less sensitive to supply and demand. 
 
For example, suppose five hunters divide the labour of hunting a deer: four do the legwork of 
pursuing the prey for hours until it is exhausted, while the fifth does the job of killing the 
exhausted animal with a spear. Suppose that, although running is harder work than spear-
throwing, running is in much greater supply: running is a skill that many people have, 
whereas spear-throwing is a rare, highly valued skill. Because of this, the skilled spear-
thrower has many more outside options than the runners, and much greater bargaining power, 
and accordingly commands a much larger fraction of the meat. Baumard’s theory appears to 
predict that we should intuitively judge this division to be fair. 
 
But do we? Intuitively, the runners deserve a share that reflects the amount of work they put 
in. They do not deserve less food, morally speaking, simply because their skills are in greater 
supply; and the spear-thrower does not deserve more food, morally speaking, simply because 
his skills are in shorter supply. At face value, it seems Baumard's evolutionary account can’t 
make sense of this: it can’t explain why intuitive judgements of moral fairness so often fail to 
track facts about relative bargaining power, and in particular why these intuitive judgements 
are not affected by supply and demand in the same way relative bargaining power is affected. 
 
In other work, Baumard has resisted the idea that his theory predicts that fairness is “nothing 
but a translation into moral norms of the relative bargaining power of individuals” (Baumard 
et al., 2013, p. 104). His response, in brief, is that it is the long term rather than the short term 
that matters, and fluctuations in supply and demand tend to wash out over the long term. A 
division is intuitively judged to be fair when it sets a norm that will prove mutually 
advantageous over the long run. Sometimes an intuitively fair division involves one agent 
waiving a short-term bargaining advantage, on the understanding that the other agent would 
likewise waive any short-term advantages that come their way in the future. For example, it is 
not intuitively fair for a hardware store to raise the price of snow shovels because there has 
just been a snowstorm, but nor is it in the store’s long-term interest to do so, since it would 
risk terminating long-term interactions with customers that are mutually advantageous (an 
example discussed in Chapter 3 of the book). 
 
However, this still seems to suggest that fairness is, for Baumard, nothing but a translation 
into moral norms of the long-term average of the relative bargaining power of individuals, 
and this still seems to be a prediction that is hard to square with our actual intuitions about 
fairness. Do we really judge that it is unfair to give a large fraction of the meat to the spear-
thrower because we implicitly expect his short-term bargaining advantage to wash out over 
the long run? Nothing of that sort is implied in the example. It may be that this particular 
team of individuals will never interact again. It may also be that, due a long-term shortage of 
raw materials, innate skills or specialist knowledge, spear-throwers are permanently in short 
supply relative to runners. But these pieces of background information about the constraints 
on supply and demand do not seem to shift our intuitive judgements of fairness, or at least not 
as much as Baumard’s theory seems to predict. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, we are not convinced that the relationship between judgements of fairness and 
bargaining power is as close as Baumard suggests. Partner choice in early human cooperation 
markets might have led to the evolution of a ‘market sense’—a faculty for making fast, 
intuitive judgements about bargaining situations—and it is not implausible that the output of 
this market sense feeds through, in some way, into our intuitive judgements of fairness. But 
we think there must be more to the story than markets alone. 
 
The origin of fairness is, of course, a subject of on-going debate, and that debate will run and 
run. Given that Baumard himself has made significant contributions to the debate since the 
publication of Comment Nous Sommes Devenus Moraux in 2010, it is a little disappointing 
that there is no epilogue, or new chapter, discussing how the literature has progressed in the 
past six years. Nevertheless, researchers with an interest in the nature of morality, whether 
they approach the topic from a philosophical, biological, psychological or anthropological 
angle, will want to consult this book, which makes a sustained case for a novel account of 
the origins of the sense of fairness. Its publication in English should be warmly welcomed. 
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